| Author Quoted | Thomas Aquinas |
| Title Quoted | De Ente et Essentia |
| Date (Year/Month/Day) | 1939/11/02 |
| Imprint | [S.l.] : [s.n.]. < 1256 |
| Quotation | The value of the distinction in De Ente et Essentia, cap. II, where Plato's separate forms are attacked and disposed of, I think, conclusively. At any rate it appears that way to me, although I do not follow the whole thing as clearly as I might. Distinction between a metaphysical and a logical definition. First and second intention. The first, metaphysical, deals with things as they are, in fact: the second, logical, treats them as they are, abstractly, in the mind. In other words, a metaphysical definition is stated in terms of act and potency and a logical definition in terms ofgenus and species, which are second intentions. They are the means of understanding things but not the things we understand. |
| Quotation Source | Run to the mountain: The Story of a Vocation. The journals of Thomas Merton, Volume 1, 1939-1941.; Edited by Patrick Hart, O.C.S.O. / San Francisco : Harper Collins. 1995, p. 84 |
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| Link to Merton's Copy |
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